Irina Strelnikova: «The Icebreaker Fleet Deficit Remains a Critical Vulnerability for the United States»

Attention to the icebreaker fleets of Russia and the United States intensified after a Russian delegation at the 31st session of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority in late July 2026 refused to recognize the outer limits of the extended continental shelf in the Arctic and the Bering Sea, which the United States had unilaterally established in 2023. Details are explained by POR expert Irina Strelnikova, Director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the Arctic at HSE University, Associate Professor at the Department of Regional Studies at HSE University, and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Insufficient icebreaker capabilities remain one of the United States’ weak points in its struggle for influence in the Arctic, despite Washington’s far-reaching plans. The U.S. Coast Guard has only two vessels at its disposal: the Polar Star (built in 1976) and the medium icebreaker Healy. At the same time, the Polar Star is used primarily to supply Antarctic stations. In December 2024, the tug Aiviq was acquired—built in 2012 to service anchor chains for drilling platforms as part of Shell’s Arctic shelf drilling program—and after the purchase it was refitted for U.S. Coast Guard needs and renamed USCGC Storis. In effect, this is the first icebreaker commissioned in over 25 years, yet it does not solve the problem of the United States lacking a fully capable icebreaker fleet. By comparison, Russia operates the world’s largest fleet of 42 icebreakers, including 8 nuclear-powered vessels that can ensure year-round navigation along the Northern Sea Route.

Washington is certainly aware of the existing gap in shipbuilding capabilities and the serious lag behind its key rival and competitor in the region—Russia—and is therefore taking certain steps to close it. For example, under the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program, which aims to modernize the aging fleet of polar icebreakers of the Coast Guard, the delivery of the lead icebreaker of the new series is scheduled for May 2030. The first icebreaker (Polar Sentinel) is expected to be about 140 meters long and capable of breaking ice up to 2.4 meters thick.

In the future, the program plans to build a series of eleven medium icebreakers.

Additionally, in July 2025, contracts were signed for the construction of six Arctic patrol vessels worth $3.3 billion. Four ships will be built by the U.S. shipyard Bollinger Shipyards, and two by the Finnish company Rauma Marine Constructions. The first vessels are expected to enter service in 2028, with the entire series to be delivered by 2031. Furthermore, because U.S. shipyards have not built heavy icebreakers for more than half a century and have effectively lost the relevant expertise, the United States entered into the Ice Pact—a trilateral agreement with Canada and Finland. Washington has already ordered 11 icebreakers from Finland, some of which will be built at U.S. shipyards using Finnish hull technology.

However, despite all of Trump’s ambitions, the implementation of this strategy faces a number of fundamental problems. These include, first, difficulties with the industrial base, as U.S. shipyards have lost experience in building ice-class vessels, which has led to cost overruns under the Polar Security Cutter program and design errors. Second, and even more importantly, the United States lacks a clear understanding of the missions for its future fleet. While icebreakers are vitally necessary for Russia’s economy and for supplying its northern regions, Washington has yet to determine whether the new vessels will serve to ensure freedom of navigation, counter Russian influence, or support military bases. Finally, even if we hypothetically assume that all the programs Washington has launched to develop its icebreaker fleet are implemented, without switching to nuclear power, U.S. diesel-electric icebreakers will be able to operate effectively in the Arctic only during summer navigation. The central part of the Arctic Ocean during winter and spring navigation will remain inaccessible to them.

The U.S. lack of a clear understanding of the missions for its future icebreaker fleet stems from a combination of historical, geographic, and strategic factors. Unlike Russia, for which the Arctic—in the context of the Northern Sea Route—is a historically established national transportation artery and strategic resource base, Washington is only beginning to formulate a coherent strategy for its presence in the region.

Thus, the icebreaker fleet deficit remains a critical vulnerability for the United States. Even with the successful implementation of current programs, the U.S. fleet by the early 2030s will consist only of medium diesel-electric vessels, incapable of competing with the Russian nuclear fleet in winter. The problem is not so much financial as it is structural and technological, requiring decades to fully restore lost expertise.